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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
FREDERICK MAY & CO., INC.
a Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
W. PRESCOTT DUNN and
TRACY COLLINS TRUST
COMPANY, a Banking
Corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 9356

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant-respondent Dunn (hereinafter
referred to as defendant), takes exception to many
of the statements that plaintiff claims to be established facts. However, comments will be made as
to only those statemls whi~h C)J'e possibly material.
.A(-~
. l f ac w-re
AI so, a dd1.tiona
necessary to properly present the issue to this Court.
The first possibly material misstatement by the
plaintiff appears 'at page 2 of appellant's brief,
wherein it is stated:
1
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"This agreement provided for a $25,000.00
broker's fee, to be divided equally between the
two brokers in the event of a sale procured
and arranged by them, said division to be
after first deducting plaintiff's expenses
(Dunn Dep. p. 3) ."
This statement is a distortion of the testimony
of the defendant. The phrase " ... in the event of
a sale procured and arranged by them ... " is completely contrary to the cited testimony, which was
that the commission was only to be divided provided
the plain tiff secured the purchaser, and, if the property was sold locally or by someone with whom the
plaintiff had nothing to do, the plaintiff was not
to participate in the commission.
At page 2 of plaintiff's brief, the statement
that " ... he (plaintiff) contacted S. & H., as well
as Guberman, to let them know he was looking for
a buyer for Keith O'Brien," is inferentially inconsistent with the facts, since the inference is that
S. & H. was being contacted as a possible buyer.
The fact is that any contact with S. & H. relative
to Guberman pertained to S. & H. backing Guberman, and it only consisted of a phone call (May
Dep. pp. 7-8) (Answer of plaintiff to Interrogatory
# 1, R. 44-45) .
At page 3 of plaintiff's brief, the statement:
"Since Mr. May had contacted S. & H. before,
he was notified by Dunn that he should again
contact S. & H. and arrange for meetings,
2
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etc., to work out a deal. Thus, extensive and
continual negoti'ations were carried on between Mr. May and S. & H., both in New York
City and in Salt Lake City, until approximately June, 1956. At this time talks were broken
off as substantially all the ground had been
covered. (May Dep. pp. 16-24) ."
is inconsistent, misleading and a distortion of the
facts, in that inferences are created to the effect
that plaintiff was negotiating extensively and continuously with S. & H. as a purchaser.
The facts are that plaintiff contacted S. & H.
at the request of the defendant because S. & H. had
previously told the defendant th'a:t they would be
interested in backing either one of two men in the
purchase of the capital stock of Keith O'Brien (R.
45). Any contact that plaintiff had with S. & H.
was, in the one instance, by direction of the defendant Dunn (May Dep. pp. 6, 25) ( R. 45), and in
every instance, S. & H. was in the role of a backer
for ·another prospective purchaser (May Dep. pp.
7-8) (R. 44-45) (May Dep. pp. 18, 19, 24, 25, 26).
At page 4 of plaintiff's brief, the statement is
made to the effect that a sale had been made to
S. & H., with whom the plaintiff had been negotiating all along. The inference from the statement
is inconsistent with the facts, in that it implies
negoti'ation by plaintiff with S. & H. as a possible
purchaser, which is not the fact, and continuous
negotiation by plaintiff with S. & H. up to the date
3
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of sale. The latter is also inconsistent with plaintiff's
testimony, who testified that at the termination
of the second Riordan transaction, and after plaintiff left Salt Lake City, that he didn't talk to S. & H.
any more, and that it was ended as far as plaintiff and S. & H. was concerned (May Dep. p. 26).
Further at page 4 of plaintiff's brief, the testimony
of Dunn is distorted in that plaintiff describes the
$11,000.00 payment to be a commission, and the
testimony is that it was a voluntary payment.
Factually, the plaintiff's connections and contacts with S. & H. were as follows:
Plaintiff's first contact with S. & H. was in
May, 1954, when the president of that company
talked over the telephone with the plaintiff to solicit his support in discouraging Mr. Guberm'an from
considering the purchase of Keith O'Brien, Inc.
stock, since the S. & H. Company was not interested
in backing Mr. Guberman in this purchase and
wanted Mr. Guberman to concentrate on his business in Colorado Springs (May Dep. p. 8) ( R. 45).
With the exception of the Guberman incident, almost two years previously, plaintiff's only other
contact with S. & H. was in March of 1956, at the
direction of the defendant, and this was in connection with the fact that S. & H. had indicated to the
defendant their interest in backing either one of
two men in the purchase of the capital stock of
Keith O'Brien ( R. 4'5) (May Dep. pp. 6, 25) .
4
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A Mr. Riordan first entered the picture in
October, 1953 (May Dep. p.13), at which time he and
the plaintiff came to Salt Lake City to negotiate
with defendant for the purchase of the Keith O'Brien
stock. The negotiations failed and the purchase was
not consummated (May Dep. p. 15).
Mr. Riordan's next appearance in this matter occurred in April, 1956, when S. & H. indicated
that they were willing to consider backing Riordan
on the Keith O'Brien deal (May Dep. p. 18). The
plaintiff, Riordan and the S. & H. group came to
Salt Lake City June 12, 1956, (May Dep. p. 20),
for the purpose of considering the deal and to draw
up the papers (May Dep. p. 23). The transaction
\vas not consummated (May Dep. p. 25) and negotiations terminated on or about June 19, 1956 (R.
28, 36). From and after June 19, 1'956, the plaintiff had no further talks with S. & H., which had
never been regarded a:s a principal, but only as a
potential backer (R. 45) (May Dep. pp. 7, 8, 18,
19, 24, 25, 26). The Keith O'Brien stock was sold
to S. & H. on July 27, 1956 (R. 28) (Plaintiff's
Exh. 2).
Additionally, the facts are that plaintiff acted
as a broker under a general non-exclusive brokerage
listing (May Dep. p. 5) (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1),
and Tracy-Collins Trust Company did not participate in the sale (Carter Dep. pp. 3, 4, 8, 9).
1

5
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE REGARDING
THE MATERIAL FACT THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS
ACTING AS A BROKER UNDER A GENERAL OR
NON-EXCLUSIVE BROKERAGE LISTING.
POINT II.
THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE REGARDING
THE MATERIAL FACT THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT
THE PROCURING CAUSE OF THE SALE OF THE
CAPITAL STOCK OF KEITH O'BRIEN, INC.
POINT III.
THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE REGARDING
THE MATERIAL FACT THAT TRACY-COLLINS TRUST
COMPANY HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE SALE
OF THE CAPITAL STOCK OF KEITH O'BRIEN, INC.
POINT IV.
EVEN ASSUMING THAT AT SOME POINT S. & H.
ADOPTED THE ROLE OF A PROSPECTIVE PURCHASER, EVEN SO THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE
REGARDING THE MATERIAL FACT THAT THE
PLAINTIFF ABANDONED HIS EFFORTS TO EFFECTUATE THE SALE TO S. & H.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE REGARDING
THE MATERIAL FACT THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS
ACTING AS A BROKER UNDER A GENERAL OR
NON-EXCLUSIVE BROKERAGE LISTING.

Generally, there are three types of brokerage
listings; namely, the general, or non-exclusive listing
which leaves the owner free to list his property with
6
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other brokers, to sell it himself, or to withdraw it
from the market. The second type involves the exclusive agency wherein terms are inserted in the
listing which provide that, for a stated period, the
owner will not deal with other brokers, yet he may
sell the property himself without liability. The third
type embodies the exclusive right to sell, in which
the owner precludes himself from selling the property without paying the brokerage commission.
As was stated in Tetrick v. Sloan, 339 P. 2d 613
(Calif.) :
"The authorization in the instant ease was
analogous to a general listing. It gave plaintiff no designated time in which to procure a
lessee and manfiestly did not give plaintiff
an exclusive agency or exclusive right to lease.
The authorization is completely silent in this
respect. In SummeTs v. Freeman, 128 Cal.
App. 2d 828, 831, 276 P. 2d 131, 133, the court
said that "the general rule on exclusive agency
agreements is stated as follows: 'A real estate
broker's authority to sell real property is not
exclusive, unless it is made so, by the contract
of employment, in unequivocal terms or by
necessary implication.' (Citation)" Had the
parties contemplated such a relationship they
surely would have so stated in the writing."
In the deposition of Mr. Frederick S. May,
plaintiff's President at page 5, appear the following
questions and answers with regard to the brokerage
agreement:
Q. Did you make a memorandum of this
7
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verbal understanding, written 1nemorandum,
after you finished?
A. I don't know if I did or not. I would
say No.
Q. You would say No. Did you consider
that this agreement that you had with Mr.
Dunn gave you an exclusive license, or an exclusive right to make the sale, or not make the
sale?
A. I would say on a moral basis, yes,
but I wouldn't say that he just outright agreed
we were his exclusive agents. But the inferences were very clear on his part and Mr.
Collins' part.
The plaintiff admitted that it was not "... outright
agreed that we were his exclusive agents." Furthermore, this proposition must be completely settled
when consideration is given to plaintiff's Exhibit 1,
wherein plaintiff confirms that this was a general
or non-exclusive agency by virtue of the following
language contained in said Exhibit, to-wit:
"The above payment to be made, of course,
with the proviso that if you should decide to
sell the business to anyone suggested by us,
that we would be entitled to the usual commission on such a deal."
In view of the plaintiff's testimony in the deposition, and the language quoted from plaintiff's
Exhibit 1, there can be no doubt but that this was
a general or non-exclusive brokerage listing, and as
such the defendant, as the owner, was free to sell
himself.
8
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POINT II.
THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE REGARDING
THE MATERIAL FACT THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT
THE PROCURING CAUSE OF THE SALE OF THE
CAPITAL STOCK OF KEITH O'BRIEN, INC.

The defendant, in support of his motion for
a sun1mary judgment, filed in the lower court a
memorandum in support thereof (R. 53-72). It
would appear that no useful purpose would be served
by repeating in this brief the argument and authorities which are already a part of the record. Indeed,
as regards this point, the plaintiff-appellant's brief,
at page 25, states that most of the citations of the
defendant, filed in connection with the motion for
summary judgment, express the general rule, which
plaintiff readily accepts.
For these reasons, repetition will be avoided,
but the defendant respectfully urges this Court to
read the said memorandum, since in addition to the
authorities cited therein, there is further pertinent
testimony of the plaintiff, not only as to this point,
but to others.
There are, however, a few further observations
that may be made. One such pertains to the distorted
and misleading statements that persistently appear
throughout pl'aintiff's brief to the effect that the
sale to S. & H. was consummated only a few days
after the plaintiff completed his negotiations. For
example, this Court's attention is directed to the
following:
9
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"The pleadings and depositions show that
there was only a relatively few days between
the concluding of negotiations and the signing
of a deal by S. & H. . . . Then, almost immediately, without his knowledge, S. & H. was
suddenly signing on the dotted line." (Plaintiff's brief, p. 15)
(The first quoted statement is utterly and compl~tely inconsistent with the pleadings and depositions, as defendant will later 'Show.)
Other examples are:
''... with their becoming sole purchaser a few
days after his last meeting with them."
(Plaintiff's brief, p. 19)
''Mr. May contacted the ultimate buyer in
this case and negotiated with it over many
months, right down to a date within only a
few days of the date the transaction was completed ... It is apparently during those few
days between the time Mr. May finished up
the negotiations with the buyer and the time
of the actual closing ... " (Plaintiff's brief,
p. 2'3).
"He had found a buyer and conducted negotiations with that buyer right up to just before the signing on the dotted line." (Plaintiff's brief, p. 24)
"This is particularly so when it is shown that
they bought only a few days following the
end of a long period of negotiations conducted
by the plaintiff ... " (Plaintiff's brief, p. 27)
This much is certain. In plain tiff''S second
amended complaint (R. 28), it is alleged that the
10
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conference, wherein Riordan was the potential purchaser and S. & H. the backer, and at which plaintiff, among others, was present, terminated on or
about June 19, 1956, and the defendant in answer
to the second amended complaint, admitted that the
conference terminated on or about June 19, 1956
(R. 36). It is a further fact that the agreement of
purchase between the defendant and S. & H. was
executed July 27, 1956 ('Plaintiff's Exhibit 2). A
period of 38 days is not just a few days, a relatively
few days, or a period of time at the inception of
which and 38 days later one could say it happened
almost immediately. And so, when the plaintiff
states in his brief at page 15 that:
" ... the pleadings and depositions show that
there was only a relatively few days between
the concluding of negoti;ations and the signing
of the deal by S. & H .... ",
unless 38 days is "only a relatively few days" such
statement is a distortion of the facts.
It is further a fact that after June 19, 1956,
plaintiff did nothing more, since he testified:

Q. Did you talk to S. & H. at the time
you were talking with the W ohls?
A. No, tha:t ended it as far as I was
concerned with S. & H.

Q. After you left Salt Lake City, when
the second Riordan transaction blew up, you
didn't talk to S. & H. any more?
11
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A. That is correct. They were never
regarded as a principal. They were only regarded as a potential backer. (May Dep. p.
26)'
and it is also a fact that the plaintiff, while attending the second negotiations in which Riordan was a
principal, testified to the following:
Q. You didn't have any conversation
out here that you heard, about S. & H. buying
the store alone, did you?
A. No.
Q. That was never mentioned?
A. No.
Q. The only thing you were out here for
was to see if you could put Riordan in as
purchaser? (May Dep. p. 24).
Plaintiff's brief at page 20 admits one basic
fact and then poses two entirely immaterial questions when it is stated:
"The evidence in the record is claimed by the
defendant to prove that S. & H. played the
role of backer for someone else right up to
June, 1'956. However, the question is: Did
they play that role in good faith? Also, was
the defendant acting in good faith in purporting to believe them?"
The basic fact that is now 'admitted in plaintiff's brief is that S. & H. was in the role of a
"backer" right up to June, 1956.
Defendant doesn't know whether S. & H. played
the role in good faith or bad faith, and whichever
12
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vvay they played it is immaterial. The point is, S.
& H. was in the role of ;a backer and the record is
clear that previously S. & H. had acted as a backer
for one Morris Guberman. Moreover, wherein was
there any duty of defendant to question what role
S. & H. was playing. Isn't the more logical and
reasonable answer: Why didn't the plaintiff take
some active steps to sell or attempt to sell the Keith
O'Brien stock to S. & H.; why didn't the plaintiff
take some active steps to convert or attempt to
convert S. & H. from the role of a backer to a purchaser? There may be a number of reasons why
plaintiff didn't, all of which the defendant agrees
are immaterial, but the one solid factual point is
that the plaintiff himself always considered, and
as of the date of his brief still does consider, S. & H.
as a backer, and never as a possible purchaser. And
plaintiff did not do anything to convert or attempt
to convert S. & H. to the role of a purchaser. There
is not one shred of testimony that shows wherein
plaintiff did anything to influenceS. & H. as a purchaser, and this in the face of the very direct question, namely :
"What do you consider you did to get Sperry
& Hutchinson into this transaction?" (May
Dep. p. 30)
The testimony of the plaintiff and of the plaintiff alone is plain and irrefutable. S. & H. was never
considered by plaintiff other than ;as a backer, and
13
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in the light of the decisions, plaintiff cannot claim
to be the efficient or procuring cause of the sale.
Plaintiff's brief is replete with ill-founded conclusions. To mention one more, at page 24 the statement is made:
"'Thus, Mr. M;ay, the agent, had already performed, according to the agency agreement.
He had found a buyer and conducted negotiations with that buyer right up to just before the signing on the dotted line."
Let us examine how many things are wrong
with the quoted statement. In the first place, it is
establi'Shed that the plaintiff went to see the officers of S. & H. at the request of the defendant
Dunn. And the reason defendant sent the plaintiff
to see S. & H. was because S. & H. had indicated
to the defendant a willingness to back one of several n1en in the purchase of Keith O'Brien stock.
Secondly, even if the plaintiff had found S.
& H., he talked with them ;as a backer, and he was
not engaged for that job. To say that Mr. May
"had already performed, according to the agency
agreement" is erroneous. If this is the case, it is
tantamount to saying that when negotiations concluded on June 19, 1956, the plaintiff, May, had
performed his part of the agency contract and was
en ti tied to a commission, even though up to said
date S. & H. was only in the role of a backer, and
had never been approached 'by the plaintiff to be14
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come a purchaser. And that, in essence, is the sum
and substance of plaintiff's case.
The plain fact of the matter is that the plaintiff
spent a considerable amount of time and effort in
attempting to effectuate a s'ale to Riordan. Riordan
and the plaintiff were present at Salt Lake City
on two different occasions. On Riordan's second
visit, the officers of S. & H. were present also. As
has been heretofore detailed, there was never any
conversation nor any mention about S. & H. buying,
and after Riordan and S. & H. broke apart, Riordan
was introduced to Eccles at the bank, to see what
assistance Riordan could get there (May Dep. p. 24) .
POINT III.
THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE REGARDING
THE MATERIAL FACT THAT TRACY-COLLINS TRUST
COMPANY HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE SALE
OF THE CAPITAL STOCK OF KEITH O'BRIEN, INC.

This point is only rna terial in the event that as
a matter of fact the plaintiff and Tracy-Collins
Company were engaged as co-brokers in the sale of
the stock of Keith O'Brien, Inc. If they were cobrokers in the complete sense, then of course i'f either
procured a purchaser, the commission earned would
be split between the two brokers.
The defendant contends that the plaintiff and
Tracy-Collins Trust Company were not co-brokers
in the complete sense. In this brief, the defendant
15
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has, with two exceptions, refrained from citing any
testimony of the defendant to establish any of the
facts. In both instances, the testimony of the defendant was first raised in plaintiff's brief. One
exception was caused by the plaintiff at page 2 of
his brief misstating the testimony of the defendant.
Inasmuch as the plaintiff first alluded to this testimony, it is again pointed out that the defendant
testified to the effect that the plaintiff was only to
receive one-half of the commission in case he brought
the purchaser in; that if it were sold locally or by
someone plaintiff had nothing to do with, plaintiff
was not to participate.
Another i tern of evidence which tends to establish that the plaintiff and Tracy-Collins Trust Company were not co-brokers in the sense herein defined has previously been referred to, and that is
plain tiff's Exhibit 1. Regarding the contents of this
Exhibit, the defendant recognizes that the phrase
"anyone suggested by us" might be interpreted to
include Tracy-Collins Trust Company. The more
reason'able interpretation, however, would seem to
include only the plaintiff in the word "us", and certainly in other places of the Exhibit the word "us"
refers solely to the plaintiff.
And there i's still additional testimony which
sheds some light on this question, and that is found
at page 5 of May's deposition, where the plaintiff
testified as follows :
16
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Q. Did you understand that - supposing Tracy Collins Trust Company had lined
up a purchaser, would you have participated
in the commission?
A. They assured me they were not working on it, that there was no one else on it at
this time, and we could work, because I would
have not taken it to have gone on any racetrack.
Q. You were the one they were solely
looking to, to line up a purchaser?
A. They were willing to work with me,
expecting I would come through, hoping I
would.
But assuming the plaintiff and Tracy-Collins
were co-brokers in the sense that a sale by either
would result in division of the commission, nevertheless, the testimony of Mr. Carter of the TracyCollins Trust Company is that Tracy-Collins had
nothing whatsoever to do with the sale. And there
cannot be any issue as to this material fact, because
the plaintiff has in no way introduced, either by
affidavit, deposition or admitted pleading, anything
to the contrary. Absent any evidence to refute the
testimony of Mr. Carter, there is, of course, no
genuine issue of material fact on this point.
POINT IV.
EVEN ASSUMING THAT AT SOME POINTS. & H.
ADOPTED THE ROLE OF A PROSPECTIVE PURCHASER, EVEN SO THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE
REGARDING THE MATERIAL FACT THAT THE

17
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PLAINTIFF ABANDONED HIS EFFORTS TO EFFECTUATE THE SALE TO S. & H.

The defendant does not believe that as a matter
of fact the plaintiff abandoned his efforts to cause
S. & H. to purchase the Keith O'Brien stock; this for
the plain and obvious reason that you cannot abandon something upon which you have never worked.
For instance, any and all efforts expended by plaintiff, so far as pertaining to S. & H., were to the extent of interesting S. & H. as a backer, and thus,
if plaintiff abandoned anything, it was an abandonment of hi's efforts to procure S. & H. as a backer,
not as a purchaser.
But assuming that for any reason it should
be conceded that S. & H. throughout the period
of the negotiations was in the role of purchaser,
then in that event, the plaintiff must be held to have
abandoned his efforts to sell the stock to S. & H.
when he ceased working on the transaction on June
1'9, 1'956. Authorities on this proposition are set
forth in the memorandum ( R. 53-72).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it should be realized that this
lawsuit is basically very simple. The defendant Dunn
entered into a general or non-exclusive listing with
18
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the plaintiff, agreeing to pay a commission if plaintiff procured a purchaser for the Keith O'Brien
stock. The plaintiff had some collateral dealings
with S. & H., regarding whether or not it would
financially back a Morris Guberman or a Mr. Riordan. Plaintiff ceased talking with S. & H. on June
19, 1956, and some 38 days thereafter, S. & H. purchased the stock from the defendant Dunn. At no
time did the plaintiff urge S. & H. to buy the stock,
nor did the plaintiff participate at all or to any
degree with the transactions that evolved between
June 19, 1956, and the final date of purchase, July
27, 1956.
The question is whether or not the plaintiff,
as a broker, was the efficient agent or procuring
cause of the sale. Did the means employed by him
and his efforts result in the sale? Were his efforts
the predominiating effective cause? It is not sufficient where the efforts are merely an indirect, incidental, or contributing cause or one of the links in
a chain of causes.
The question of a litigant's intent is often a
decisive factor in a lawsuit. If plaintiff prevails,
the result is to award him a commission because
stock was sold to a third party who was never regarded by plaintiff as a principal, but only as a
potential backer (May Dep. p. 26).
The defendant contends th'at there is no genuine
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issue as to any material fact, and as a matter of
law the judgment of the lower court must be affirmed, since plaintiff was not the procuring cause
of the sale.
Respectfully submitted,
MULLINER, PRINCE and MANGUM
Attorneys for Respondent
817 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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